Even if legislative expansions of the writ ratchet up the protection offered by the Clause—a proposition that the Court has never squarely embraced—Congress surely has more flexibility to shape jurisdiction here than it does in the executive detention context. Over the past two decades, Congress has made several efforts to limit the availability of the writ of habeas corpus.
In , it passed the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act AEDPA , which prevented prisoners from filing multiple habeas petitions and mandated a deferential standard of review of state court decisions. And in , Congress stripped from the federal courts the power to grant habeas relief to enemy combatants imprisoned outside the United States.
These laws present difficult and controversial constitutional questions. Does the writ extend outside the territory of the United States? How much deference should the courts give Congress and the executive in determining the scope of habeas relief, especially in national security cases?
I argue that Congress has the authority to regulate the availability of habeas corpus relief through laws like AEDPA so long as they afford prisoners with plausible innocence claims an opportunity for relief, but that Congress does not have the authority to withhold habeas relief from combatants detained at prisons like Guantanamo Bay that are under complete U.
AEDPA had two principal effects on the availability of habeas relief. First, it imposed procedural limits on habeas petitions, including a one-year statute of limitations and a bar on successive petitions. See 28 U. Second, it required federal courts to employ a deferential standard of review when reviewing state court decisions. My perspective is informed by the influential views of the great Judge Henry Friendly.
To Judge Friendly, the core of habeas corpus relief concerns prisoners with colorable claims of innocence. Accordingly, Judge Friendly believed that Congress could enact procedural and substantive limits on the availability of habeas relief.
AEDPA codifies such limits. Moreover, AEDPA largely preserves what Judge Friendly believed to be the essential function of habeas: ensuring that the innocent have an opportunity to vindicate their claims in a federal court. See Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant?
Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments , 38 U. In McQuiggin v. In other cases such as Woods v. Etherton , however, the Supreme Court has elevated the standard for habeas relief so as to make it nearly impossible for prisoners, even innocent ones, to obtain relief. So while I believe AEDPA as a general matter is consistent with the Constitution, I harbor concerns about the deferential standard of review of state court decisions mandated by the Supreme Court.
They especially distrusted New Englanders, whom they associated with industrialization, and they had no sympathy with abolition. Milligan, like other Peace Democrats, believed New England capitalists were using the war to enhance their own economic interests, while placing the military burden on common men from the western states. In the elections of , Indiana Democrats gained strength as public opinion became unsettled about the war, which was not going well for the Union.
This sentiment emboldened Milligan, who became convinced that the Emancipation Proclamation was proof that Lincoln had fallen under the influence of abolitionist New Englanders.
Union victories in convinced voters that the tide had turned against the Confederacy, and the Peace Democrats began to lose public support. Embittered, Milligan joined with sympathizers to form secret societies, clubs designed to further the antiwar cause.
One of these societies, the Sons of Liberty, named Milligan an officer, perhaps without his knowledge. The activities of the society did not remain secret for long, and the Republican governor and the commander of the Indiana district of the Union Army employed spies to learn more about its inner workings. Milligan and five others were accused of conspiring to seize arms and ammunition at federal arsenals and to liberate Confederate prisoners held in several northern camps.
The men were tried before a military tribunal, even though civil courts were open and operating in Indiana. Four of the men were found guilty of treason; the military court sentenced three of them to hang. Milligan was one of the three condemned men.
He petitioned a federal circuit court to grant a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the military had no authority to try him. When the two judges disagreed on the decision, Milligan appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court agreed unanimously with Milligan. The military court lacked jurisdiction, the justices concluded; the Constitution was not suspended in times of war, and a military trial of civilians while domestic courts were open denied the accused of their rights to a grand jury indictment and trial by jury.
No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies [crises] of government. A state of war did not suspend the Constitution or its guarantee of individual rights. Released from prison in April , Milligan sought damages for the time he spent behind bars. He successfully sued the governor, members of the military commission, and others he believed were responsible for his imprisonment, but a recently passed state law limited his award to five dollars.
He returned home a hero, convinced that his case had established a vital principle of American liberty: government must honor the rights of individuals, even during national emergencies. Congress worried, with good reason, that southern state courts would not protect the rights of newly freed slaves, so it passed the Habeas Corpus Act of This measure allowed individuals imprisoned or detained under state authority to seek a writ of habeas corpus from a federal court if they believed the state had violated their constitutional rights.
The act changed the nature of the writ itself. Previously, it had applied only to questions about the legality of detention before trial; now habeas corpus could be invoked by federal judges to review detention after conviction in both federal and state courts. The twentieth century witnessed increased use of habeas corpus in all areas of law, largely because of the expansion of constitutionally protected rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Its use by prisoners is an especially controversial modern use of the habeas petition. Death row inmates often seek post-conviction relief, which is a review after a final judgment to determine whether the trial was fair. Two bills have been introduced in Congress that would restore habeas corpus rights to detainees.
The bill makes clear that the Constitution is the law of the land—and that no president can make up his or her own rules regarding torture and abuse. The only thing scarier than a government that would take away our basic freedoms is a Congress and a people that would let it happen.
Second, unless a United States Court of Appeals gave its approval, a petitioner may not file successive habeas corpus petitions. The Detainee Treatment Act of DTA and the Military Commissions Act of MCA further narrowed the scope of habeas relief, providing that prisoners held in Guantanamo Bay may not access the federal courts through habeas corpus; instead, they must go through the military commissions and then seek appeal in the D.
Circuit Court. However, the Supreme Court in Boumediene v. Bush expanded the territorial reach of habeas corpus, ruling that the Suspension Clause affirmatively guaranteed the right to habeas review. Thus, alien detainees designated as enemy combatants who were held outside the United States had the constitutional right to habeas corpus. Federal statutes 28 U. There are two prerequisites for habeas review: the petitioner must be in custody when the petition is filed, and a prisoner who is held in state government custody must have exhausted all state remedies, including state appellate review.
Any federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus to a petitioner who is within its jurisdiction. The habeas petition must be in writing and signed and verified either by the petitioner seeking relief or by someone acting on his or her behalf.
Federal courts are not required to hear the petition if a previous petition presented the same issues and no new grounds were brought up. Finally, a federal judge may dismiss the petition for the writ of habeas corpus if it is clear from the face of the petition that there are no possible grounds for relief. Today, habeas corpus is mainly used as a post-conviction remedy for state or federal prisoners who challenge the legality of the application of federal laws that were used in the judicial proceedings that resulted in their detention.
0コメント